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Governance and Goodness in the Public Arena
ABSTRACT
We discuss the association of governance with notions of goodness and virtue in the public arena. In
line with moves away from universal notions of best practice and toward recognition of local
initiatives, we suggest that public management research give more explicit attention to the ethical
frameworks that underlie and complicate definitional and values-based debates. We suggest that
greater consideration of the ethics of public management may assist researchers to move beyond
definitional dilemmas and will inform analysis of hybrid or 'reformed' bureaucracies where competing
logics may be in play.
Key words: Governance, Ethics, New Public Management, Public Sector Reform
In recent times the notion of good governance has been heralded as something to be emulated in both
general and public management arenas. In this paper, we unpack the association of governance with
goodness and virtue and suggest that the universalism of such notions is at odds with current emphases
on governance practice that take into account local knowledge, local context and the 'stickiness' of
past practices (see Duit & Galaz 2008; Ezzamel & Reed 2008). First, we examine the enthusiasm with
which the discourse of good governance has been adopted and extended, arguing that recent efforts to
distinguish the nature of governance specific to public management may divert attention from its basis
in virtue ethics. Then we discuss several sources of complications to this ethical position including
debates over the existence and nature of New Public Management ('NPM'); emphasis on opportunism
and corruption; challenges to agency theory; the logic of complexity theory; and, as noted above, the
recognition of localization. Extending such efforts, we suggest that more specific attention to the
ethics of public management may assist researchers to move beyond definitional dilemmas and to
think further about analysis of hybrid or 'reformed' bureaucracies as sites where competing ethical
logics may be in play.
GOVERNANCE AND GOODNESS
Governance is about the steering and running of organizations; about setting up structures to enable an
organization to be run. Having 'emerged from virtual obscurity to take a central place in
contemporary debates in the social sciences' (Pierre & Peters 2000: 1), governance has now been
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applied at levels ranging from government and public sector management to the allocation of
responsibility for leadership and decision making across an organization and even to the management
of a project team. It is particularly important in contemporary public management where managers are
responsible for achieving results and take personal responsibility for doing so (Hughes 2003).
As Frederickson has noted, 'because governance is a power word, a dominant descliptor, and
the current preference of academic tastemakers, there has been a rush to affix to it all of the other
fashions of the day' (2005: 285). In broader terms, governance has even been 'generally recognized as
an important determinant of a country's long-term economic growth and development' (Kulshreshtha
2008: 557) and is so pervasive, according to Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 612), that '21 st-century
societies, institutions, organizations and practices now have the means and modes available to regulate
and control our lives in ways that were barely imaginable to previous generations' (cf. Kjaer 2004).
However, despite such ubiquity, there is little agreement on the meaning of the term
governance and the variety among its definitions and usages has become controversial and so debated
that the word has lost much of its utility. Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 597) argued that the term
governance has become an umbrella term or perhaps an 'empty signifier' (Zizek 1989) that holds little
specific meaning (see also Minogue, Polidano & Hulme 1998; Pierre & Peters 2000; Pillay 2004) and
whose 'definition, usage and development are necessarily and unavoidably tied to contested value
assumptions over the core of its theoretical specification and the range of its empirical application'
(Ezzamel & Reed 2008: 599; see also Bevir & Rhodes 2003). Similarly, and within the global arena,
Weiss (2000: 808) has quoted a quip that the notion of global governance could be, 'like the grinning
but bodyless Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland, an agreeable notion because it is without
substance' .
In addition to its being everywhere or nowhere (depending on one's view of the subject), a
common theme is that the discourse of governance is associated with goodness, a theme that is
reminiscent of the notion that organizing 'drives chaos away' (Kaulingfreks & ten Bos 2008: 107).
For example, Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 601) cited Williamson's (1996: 11) argument that governance
is associated with the effecting of 'good order' and that 'raJ good governance structure is thus usefully
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thought of as an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of
transactions, is decided' (see also Pillay 2004; Stoker 1998; Weiss 2000).
Such is the value placed on good governance that in a recent review Camerer (2006: 153)
elevated it to a place alongside democracy in suggesting that:
[G]ood govemance has now become a major, publicly embraced concern of ... many leaders,
donors, international organizations, and governments, including the 191 member states of the
United Nations, who at the 2005 UN World Summit reaffirmed their commitment to the
Millennium Declaration and its eight bold Millennium Goals regarding the promotion of
democracy, human rights, good governance, and improved global security (emphasis 111
original).
Perhaps this association IS not surprising, for there has been a growmg acceptability of
discussions about the comparative quality of countries' political and economic governance system
since the 1990s. According to Weiss (2000), this was due to the glaring illegitimacy of some regimes,
widespread democratization in the third world and Eastern Europe, the proliferation of non-state actors
such as non-governmental organizations, and to the need to recognize that humanitarian interventions
by other countries may be necessary despite the UN Charter's statement advocating non-interference
in the domestic affairs of member countries. Reviewing the growth of good governance in the global
context, Weiss (2000) argued that its focus, therefore, was on attenuating
the unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market
systems ...As Bo-as has written, 'the World Bank operationalised "bad governance" as
personalisation of power, lack of human rights, endemic corruption and un-elected and
unaccountable governments'. And so, 'good governance must be the natural
opposite' ....Good governance has become a political and economic conditionality that is
inseparable from debates about appropriate bilateral and multilateral financing for developing
and formerly socialist bloc countries (Weiss 2000: 80l).
Weiss (2000) argued that such debate has more recently moved toward the United Nations' emphasis
on 'deepening democracy', capacity building for sustainable human development, and 'humane
governance' that includes good political, economic and civic governance and in which principles of
ownership, decency and accountability are 'inextricable linked' (Weiss 2000: 805; see also Moncrieffe
1998; Pillay 2004).
3
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This international context further highlights that governance is all too readily associated with
the good and is easily conflated with (or perhaps boosted by) its associations with transparency and
accountability (see Kulshreshtha 2008: 557). By 1997, the World Bank linked improved governance
not only to successful development but also to poverty reduction (World Bank 1997), Kulshreshtha
(2008: 559) commenting that 'good governance matters to poverty-reduction as it improves the overall
quality of basic social and infrastructural services while making them more accessible to the poor' .
Governance and Government: Derivations and Distinctions
Given this agenda, we suggest that the notion of good governance can be regarded as a contemporary
manifestation both of viltue ethics, for it is associated with normative ways of being that are highly
valued and seen as having intrinsic worth for a community, and of the deontological principle of just
distribution (Hursthouse 1999; Legge 1998). Perhaps the broad appeal of this association is why the
discourse of governance has been so enthusiastically and widely adopted, leading public management
scholars to feel a need to defend their disciplinary boundaries and to remind us that government and
governance have different meanings. Indeed, articulation of this difference has drawn much
discussion within the public management literature, where 'current use does not treat governance as a
synonym for government' (Rhodes 1996: 652). Similarly, Pierre and Peters argued that government
and governance may have the same derivation but that 'they need not, and indeed, should not, be taken
to mean the same thing' (Pierre & Peters 2000: 29).
For example, while Kennett commented that 'with the change from government to governance
the governing administration is now only one player amongst many others in the policy arena'
(Kennett 2008: 4; see also Osborne & Gaebler 1992), there remains a clear meaning attached to the
word government: Government is generally considered to be the formal apparatus of society, backed
by the force of the police and the army, an apparatus that can impose its will on the society. As there
can be governance without government (Rhodes 1996), defining governance as being only about the
public or about public administration can be viewed as inadequate, for governance needs to be looked
at in its wider, and original sense of steering (see Rosenau 1997).
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Despite this, some in public management still take a narrow perspective on governance. For
example, one recent OECD paper defined governance as 'the formal and informal arrangements that
determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out, from the perspective
of maintaining a country's constitutional values in the face of changing problems, actors and
environments' (2005: 16). The same paper also confused governance with government. It argued:
The 30 member countries of the OECD share core governance elements. These have emerged
with the evolution of the modern state and include: democracy and citizenship; representation;
a constitution; the rule of law; competitive pmty and electoral systems; a permanent civil
service; separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; and
secularity (OECD 2005: 15).
While we argue against confining governance to the public, we are aware that the term offers
legitimacy due to its association with the good and the viltuoUS. Thus, even though the greatest
CUlTent usage is in terms of corporate governance rather than public governance, definitions of
governance in the public arena often pay insufficient attention to its usage and meaning in the private
sector. This is unfOltunate as it also ignores the position that governance is not just about government
but also about the quasi-governmental links that are more prevalent now than when government
involvement always meant government delivery (cf. Kamarck 2002; KettI 2005). While governance
on behalf of the government can exist and without authority or control by government, this is not
needed as a definition of governance as such activities can co-exist within the normal meaning of
governance as setting up a set of rules to run organizations. Again, governance needs to be able to
include the rules for a tennis club or how the board of a company or private school is to operate.
Thus, no discussion of the term 'governance' can proceed without consideration of
governance in the private sector. Indeed, it could be argued that there has been more serious theorising
in corporate governance in the private sector than in public sector governance in recent years. From
principal-agent theory to transaction cost theory to Enron and Sarbanes/Oxley, questions of corporate
governance have dominated management in the private sector. Of course, there is a tangential
government involvement here in that the corporation's legal environment as set out by government is a
5
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key consideration in issues of corporate governance. However, it is not the only consideration and
neither is it necessarily the most important.
The more recent concerns about corporate governance have been mainly about designing
structures of accountability that lead to good managerial pelformance. The motivation is mainly to
maintain and enhance shareholder and investor confidence rather than to satisfy any direct
requirements from government and the ethical framework on which such design is based is one of
consequentialism and focus on outcomes rather than the possession of inherent virtue or the
deontological following of rules and principles known as 'duty ethics' (see Cunningham 2003). In
public management, this thinking has been manifested most clearly in discussions of 'entrepreneurial
government', which stresses 'competition, markets, customers and measuring outcomes' (Bevir &
Rhodes 2003: 46) and from the internal emphasis on performance measurement and accountability
under NPM (Hughes 2003). For example, a review of corporate governance in Australia stated that 'a
robust governance framework should, through transparency and accountability mechanisms, link
power and responsibility to pelformance and review' (Australia 2003: 2-3). Perhaps one reason why
debate over NPM and whether or not it exists (Christensen, Lie & Uegried 1997; Hood & Peters 2004)
has raged so fiercely stems from its very basis in shifting the ethics of governance from a virtue to
consequentialist position (see Bishop & Connors 2003).
From Goodness to Preventing and Countering Opportunism
Thus, we suggest that over-concern with definitional deliberations on the term governance in public
management has the effect of diverting or delaying attention to its ethics, including the more critical
discussion of governance and particularly of good governance that is occurring in other disciplines
(e.g., Ezzamel & Reed 2008). h·onically, it is this very goodness that limits the ways in which the
term governance is conceived, for good governance has been all too readily contrasted with its
obverse, with cOlTuption, leaving very little space for addressing the greyness in-between (e.g.,
Kulshreshtha 2008; Camerer 2006; Pillay 2004).
While the study of corruption has received much recent attention (e.g. Academy of
Management Review, 2008), the ready link between governance and cOlTuption is particularly evident
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within what Ezzamel and Reed (2008) have termed the 'rationalistic' perspective on governance,
which emphasises efficiency maximization and takes the view that objective, quantifiable indicators of
the extent to which such efficiency is achieved can be developed and verified (see also Brennan &
Solomon, 2008). Under this view, Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 600) argued that humans are seen as
'essentially opportunistic' (see also Kulshreshtha 2008 for public management; Jensen 2000 and
Keasey, Short & Wright 2005 for corporate applications) and that it is necessary to increase
transparency as this will 'make it more difficult for anyone to act unfairly or corruptly, to reduce the
grounds for reasonable suspicion, and thus to increase trust. Increased transparency brings a radical
change of work culture, from a "default setting" of secrecy to one of openness' (Osborne 2004: 292).
Such a view is clearly based on the assumptions of distrust and oppOltunism, its ethics more in line
with Machiavellian republicanism than with Aristotle's virtue ethics and view of the polis as an
enabling site that assists growth and development (Pocock 1975).
One consequence is that weaknesses in corporate governance have been identified as
contributing to corporate failures and corporate frauds (see Brennan & Solomon 2008 for several
examples). However, accompanying the analysis of such cases in the private sector has come the
growing recognition of the creation of value beyond narrow notions of financial value and of
governance beyond the guaranteeing of shareholder wealth, including recognition of firm-specific
human assets, social and environmental resources (Bhasa 2004). Accordingly, agency theory has at
least to some extent given way to the recognition that the moral basis of stakeholders' interests is
greater than the interests of shareholders (see Collier & Roberts 2001 for comparisons; Martin 2003),
and to a 'raging debate' on the relative advantages of stakeholder versus shareholder theory (Bhasa
2004; see also Agatiello 2008): on whose good matters most and on whether or not there is a place for
reciprocity (Legge, 1998).
Further Complications and Challenges for Governance Research
In addition, several further factors have complicated simple consequentialist and virtue logics. These,
which we now discuss, include the relevance of unintended consequences; the more formal
recognition of the difficulties of consequentialism that is evident in complex systems theory; the
7
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conflation of governance with and the recognition of localization as a challenge to best practice and (at
least universalist forms of) virtue ethics.
Beyond good (and bad) governance. Reviewing a range of perspectives on governance,
Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 612) noted a common and 'sustained analytical focus on the detailed
regulative practices and forms through which power and control are, at least temporarily, stabilized
with sufficient force to permit the emergence of domination structures that make economic, political
and cultural governance possible'. In addition, unintended consequences can emerge due to power
dependencies, particularly if one takes the view that the focus of governance is on 'governing
mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government' (Stoker 1998:
17).
This sort of thinking also informs Duit and Galaz's (2008) article on governance and
complexity, where they examine the potential for non-linear change and how governance systems can
both buffer and weaken the capacity to govern complex adaptive systems: 'how different governance
models handle processes of multilevel, uncertain, and nonlinear change' (Duit & Galaz 2008: 312). In
complex adaptive systems, small changes can trigger irreversible system transformations and
interactions can result in 'surprises' where there are poorly understood interaction effects and
cascading effects, particularly in tightly coupled systems where disturbances may become amplified
and consequences are neither easily anticipated or easily assessed. We suggest that such systems are
worthy of examination and that public management scholars should focus more on unintended
consequences, organizational surprises and amplifications in efforts to extend the ethical vocabulary of
research into governance beyond simple notions of good and bad governance.
Beyond best practice. In addition, the subjects of governance research are becoming more
varied, both in the public and private domains. For example, Brennan and Solomon (2008) discussed
how corporate governance research, even in the accounting and finance area, has moved from its
traditional focus on Anglo-Saxon stock markets to a greater recognition of variety; of divergent
practices and of the importance of insider control by founding families and large institutions such as
banks or institutions of the state rather than singular notions of 'best practice' which, we argue, are
often (ironically) 'benchmarked' in terms of comparative (consequentialist) outcomes (see Wolfram
8
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Cox, Mann & Samson 1997). This shift has also been noted by Kushreshta (2008: 562), who
commented on how the World Bank's initiatives have shifted from those based on models of 'best
practice' until the 1990s to notions of 'good fit' preceded by '[a]n in-depth understanding of the
institutional or ground realities of a country' (see also Moncrieffe 1998). While some may see this as
a compromise to the universalism of virtue ethics, others place virtues within a specific ethos,
recognising the need to locate ethics within a particular social setting (see Macintyre 1984).
The recognition of local context is having an important impact on the proliferation of models
of corporate governance. For example, Bhasa (2004) reviewed the degree of convergence and
divergence among such models and also distinguished differences in ownership structures between the
diffusion seen in the US and the (traditional) concentration seen in most continental and Asian
countries in his discussion of the globalization of best practices and the growth of comparative
corporate governance (see also Weiss 2000). Bhasa commented on the challenges that such
globalization provides and how the East Asian economic crisis triggered the need for many countries
to adopt better governance practices (2004: 6), leading to a push for convergence in governance
practices that may not be achievable given the realities of differing ownership concentrations and
differing regulatory mechanisms in different countries, even with the growth of market-based
economic systems and the transition efforts underway in eastern Europe and some Asian countries.
Kulshreshta (2008) also commented on this development, noting that the World Bank has
encouraged local community participation in decision making; for example, in Pakistan, water users'
associations have been created and have been delegated authority to operate and maintain inigation
canals, the maintenance of which has been contracted out to the private sector. Such efforts illustrate
what Bevil' and Rhodes (2003) have identified as the 'marriage' of NPM with liberal democracy (and
perhaps the need to negotiate both consequentialist and virtue ethics), for the World Bank and other
international institutions have become more interested in how countries, particularly countries
receiving aid, organize and run themselves. Indeed, Bevil' and Rhodes have an additional definition of
governance as the new political economy which re-examines both the government of the economy and
the boundaries between civil society, state and the market economy as they become increasingly
9
ANZAM 2009 Page 12 of 18
blUlTed (2003: 48-49; also see Fountain, 2001 for a discussion of the greater use of markets and
market-based systems under NPM).
As Bhasa (2004) has argued, contemporary approaches to governance examine a wide range
of issues including the roles of politics, of culture, of the origins of individual countries' political
structures and legal systems in justifying divergent corporate governance and of the possibilities for
facilitating international codes of conduct as emphasis has moved from internal control via incentive
alignment and improvements in contracting practices to outside-in strategies or control mechanisms
from outside the corporation to protect investor or shareholder wealth from expropriation by insiders
(Bhasa 2004: 9, see also Agatiello 2008; Kulshreshtha 2008; Osborne 2004).
For example, Kulshreshtha (2008:560) has reviewed the World Bank's emphasis on aid
disbursement to assist countries in the building of budgeting and expenditure management systems,
commenting that development initiatives may end up focusing more on short-term projects than on
longer term long term efforts to develop competitive and well-governed institutions. Bhasa (2004)
argued that the emphasis toward outsider-oriented models of corporate governance marked by the
existence of a widely diffused ownership structure, liquid stock markets and a low level of inter-
corporate crossholdings is a fad and that integration of domestic corporate practices with international
standards will only occur where there is the political will to SUppOlt such integration. As he stated,
'[c]orporate governance problems do not end by imitating best practices of some other country' and
that it would be preferable for there to be 'concerted efforts by countries to understand their internal
strengths' (Bhasa 2004: 16) and for new approaches to corporate governance to emerge 'in the
experimental economies with the right balance of market-oriented, relationship-based and ... native
models of governance' (2004: 17). Similarly, Kulshreshtha (2008: 562) has commented on how
development projects need to be sensitive to the 'institutional realities' of a developing country.
As Pillay (2004: 588) has argued with respect to South Africa, '[a]ny focus on corruption must
be coupled with an equivalent focus on the positive aspects of good governance', recognising that a
secure and stable environment is necessary for good governance to be sustained; and, thus, for
researchers to investigate case examples where good governance is not only a possibility but a reality,
even if that reality must always be understood within local contexts.
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NEW DIRECTIONS:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNANCE RESEARCH
While such thinking may well offer us much to assist us in understanding the current crisis in our
financial markets, Duit and Galaz (2008) suggest that in the governance arena it highlights the need to
consider effects across nested governance systems (and not just within organizations) and to examine
effects across time. It may also be quite encouraging. For example, Duit and Galaz (2008) discuss
how local changes can make a difference, drawing on Tsai's (2006) example of how 'coping strategies
involving (formally illegal) local-level markets and firms eventually contributed to comprehensive
reforms of China's economic policy, ruling party, and state' (Duit & Galaz 2008: 327). Duit and
Galaz argue that only a robust type of governance - one that combines an ability for early detection of
change with flexibility in decision making, dense patterns of cooperative action and the ability to
reorganise- is likely to perform well regardless of the degree of certainty and the rate of change it
experiences as it is 'well-equipped for handling steady-state governance, long-term transformation
processes, and sudden changes alike' (Duit & Galaz 2008: 321; see also Stoker 1998). They use the
examples of air-traffic control systems, military organizations, large-scale power systems,
preindustrial English agrar"ian communities and medieval communities in Japan and it is important that
'reformed' public organizations that are purportedly moving away from traditional bureaucracy
toward enterprise management or NPM (or both) be studied in terms of how well they are achieving
this combination of flexibility and stability and managing what are potentially competing logics.
However, '[d]esigning governance systems that simultaneously produce high levels of
collective action and learning often means oven"iding basic institutional features such as path
dependency and stickiness - a feat that is not likely to be accomplished easily' (Duit & Galaz 2008:
329; see also Bhasa 2004) and is also worthy of fUlther research. We can observe examples of both
traditional and new bureaucracies that deliberately select, repress, discard or restore elements of
bureaucratic norms and values (Bolin & Harenstam 2009) and some bureaucracies have been
described as more 'enabling' (Adler & Borys 1996), as more 'collegial', as more 'democratic' (Clegg,
Courpasson, & Phillips 2006) and more or less 'trustworthy' (Uhr, 2005) than others. Thus, we
11
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further suggest that the public organizations most worthy of examination are those that purport to
achieve, at least to some degree, these characteristics.
One current emphasis (and source of such stickiness) is the importance of organizational
culture. For example, Osborne (2004: 293) points to the culture changes that should be associated with
organizational efforts to increase transparency. He argues that' [i]ncreased transparency is a necessary
response to a more educated and more informed public and a less secure world' but also notes how
difficult it may be to overcome 'a preoccupation with confidentiality' and then to deal with effects
such as the costs of compliance, the possibility of reduced documentation and increased risk aversion.
Osborne (2004: 294) also argues that accountability, which 'requires accounts to be given, [and]
actions to be reported' to line management and other stakeholders, demands a culture change 'that
goes beyond compliance with the rules'. He suggests that this can also have negative effects, for
cultures focused on outputs can often impose targets and that imposition can lead to problems where
figures are manufactured or categories blurred (e.g., Loveday 2006). Thus accountability can create
corruption, which is a rather disconcerting thought and one that also deserves further research
attention (note Uhr's caution 1990). Accordingly, if the organizations selected for study are also those
that exhibit strong traditional cultures but are also held to public account (e.g., police services, health
providers, courts), the particular negotiation of tensions between progression and tradition is likely to
be quite revealing and may inform analysis of less extreme cases in the public domain.
In conclusion, it is now time to develop a more research-informed agenda into governance
discourses and their effects; into how the specific associations among governance, transparent
processes and accountability of outcomes play out to serve particular interests; and into the changing
nature of control in the public arena where the particular mix of public and private enterprises and
practices may have very different effects. Depending on whether the setting is one of urban
development, education, healthcare or policing, there is a need to negotiate tensions among virtue,
deontological and consequentialist ethics as they are played out in the enactment of particular policies
rather than in the overly general notion of good governance. We suggest that such an agenda will
provide a new basis for comparison among the plethora of opinions on governance and allow a way
forward for discussion of both hybrid organisations and hybrid ethics.
12
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